The Resilient U.S. Economy

If the stock market is the pulse of the American economy, the outlook might be better than expected.

In a conversation I had with noted Wall Street analyst and international trader James Vena, he asked a very interesting question: “Where was the Dow a year ago?” Answer: About 12,000. “And where is the Dow today?” About 12,000.

Vena pointed out that the economy has withstood some serious challenges this year, including:

• A debt crisis that would threaten the European economy and the Euro currency itself.
• A significant cheapening of the U. S. dollar.
• A disruption in oil supply from Libya caused by a series of uprisings in the Middle East and a corresponding spike in fuel prices.
• An earthquake and tsunami in Japan that would disrupt world trade including components for global auto production.
• Flooding in Southeast Asia that further disrupts the global supply chain.
• An attempt by a U.S. political party to hold a lifting of the country’s debt ceiling resulting in a lowering of the credit rating.
• The bankruptcy of a major legacy U.S. airline.
• Continuing U.S. housing foreclosures and a further decline in home values.

The U.S. economy is far from out of the woods. But it has withstood a serious assault in the past year and not slipped into a double-dip recession. Will the upcoming election year bring about new challenges, or will the economy get a break?

Mike Smitka as devil's advocate: but it's housing prices that are weighing down household balance sheets, not the stock market. Until you get into fairly high incomes shareholdings are primarily indirect, through retirement plans -- are Americans really going to cut back on their contributions further in order to buy a new car???? And sitting at 9%-plus unemployment for 2 years is "resilient"?

The Ford-GM Stock Equation

As with the economy, the stock market will continue to evolve. So far this year, though, auto stocks, specifically, have hit some hard times.

Surprising to many is the fact that the stock of General Motors has dropped to about $21 per share from its $35-per-share post-IPO high a year ago. Even more surprising is that Ford’s stock has dropped to about $11 per share from $18 in the same time frame. This decline, despite impressive sales gains and profits, and improved fixed costs, now that both companies' VEBAs have capped legacy costs while their UAW contracts have removed the threat of strikes and wage hikes.

Of course, in the past year there have been headwinds: high oil prices, the Japanese tsunami, and the debt crisis debacle, to name a few. Both companies have taken hits on quality, with GM experiencing bad PR due to some Chevy Volts that burst into flames during crash testing and Ford being slammed in a J.D. Power quality survey.

Despite these obstacles, the two companies have stood firm. GM announced the reopening of the old Saturn plant in Spring Hill, Tenn., to build the Chevy Equinox. Both companies continue to increase volume, marketshare, and profits. They have both been reducing incentives while maintaining sales momentum.

Once GM’s stock price gets to a certain level, expect the Treasury Department to sell quantities of the taxpayer’s GM stock. The outcome: a somewhat depressed price.

So what is your prognostication for the upcoming year? Buy? Sell? Hold?

GM recently began paying a dividend on preferred stock while Ford just announced a 5 cent per quarter dividend, its first since 2006.

David Ruggles has spent his career in every phase of the retail side of the auto business, new and used, sales and management, including consulting and training in both the U.S. & Japan. Ruggles has been a dealer for Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, Dodge, GMC, Ford, Mazda, and Subaru, and has consulted for one of the world’s largest privately owned Toyota dealer groups located in Japan. He blogs here at blogspot and writes regular columns for several publications.

From whence will they come? -- profits, that is.

In North America the pricing umbrella created by the need of the Detroit Three to fund retiree health care is unwinding, while the Europeans are fleeing the Euro to add capacity here; the Japanese began diversifying out of their yen cost base 15 years ago. In the short run, that may improve profits for the Detroit Three and the Germans at the expense of the Japanese, but will ultimatlely enhance rivalry and lower profits for the industry as a whole. Europe remains in the doldrums, and the excess capacity in China will become more apparent as sales slow to a merely torrid pace. Ditto India. Brazil? South Africa? Sure, there will be markets that grow, but will they grow faster than new capacity is added? I can't think of an exception.

That pressure is obscured by shifts among market segments, particularly in the move away from small cars in the US and China that boosted profits for some firms. It is also obscured by exit, the role of which is inadequately recognized. In Europe VW snapped up SEAT, Skoda and others while Ford and GM consolidated formerly autonomous UK and German operations. In Japan Toyota absorbed Hino, Isuzu, and Daihatsu and now has a large though not yet controlling stake in Fuji Heavy Industries, Subaru's parent. Meanwhile foreign partners have unloaded their stakes in Mazda and Mitsubishi, which face a shrinking domestic market and a yen whose value makes exports unprofitable. No one is likely to value them solely for their engineering capabilities; their demise is only a matter of time. The US looks different partly because of large capacity adjustments by the Detroit Three, but we've also seen the demise of AMC, Suzuki, Isuzu, and Mazda while Mitsubishi's plant continues to run at unsustainably low capacity. If we include the elimination of brands such as Saturn and the cessation of exports by various firms, exit is significant. Inside Korea, Hyundai gobbled up Kia while GM purchased Daewoo and Renault picked up Ssangyong. The survival of brand names makes it hard to know what operations remain. Ditto Australia, where the Ford and GM affiliates were at one time stand-alone companies.

You might say "but China." Few outsiders are aware that there were 120 firms in that market, which was dominated by a host of minuscule operations owned by the governments of provinces and large cities. They had captive markets -- the models made in Shanghai couldn't be found on the streets of Beijing, and vice-versa. Of course some of these firms and subsequent private entrants (Geely, Chery and BYD) continue in business. But the market is dominated by those Chinese firms that poured their efforts into joint ventures; they've created jobs and been able to keep a slice (as a first approximation, half) of the profits, and some of them have quietly gobbled up failing regional firms. That's important because, while the central government in Beijing has been able to eliminate the domestic trade barriers in industry after industry that impeded the creation of a national economy, the legacy of local fiefdoms remains visible in the vehicle market. VW and GM, strongest in Shanghai, have done very well. Who will "own" Sichuan Province, with a population of over 100 million? It won't be a local firm, because their exit continues.

So as I look across the world (OK, on a good day I can only see 40 miles from my mountain ridge home), well, what strikes me is the likelihood that in the aggregate profits will continue to erode. Consumer preference for choice offsets that, allowing an amazing diversity of product to survive in the marketplace. From time to time individual firms will themselves with the right vehicle in the right place, and do quite well. But that will be offset by poor profits elsewhere. In the background, there's the pressure to invest in new technologies. No one can risk not pouring resources into R&D, as regulatory pressure for safer products, lower emissions and higher fuel efficiency keeps raising the technology bar. But with expensive new and less expensive old technologies continuing side-by-side in the marketplace (and typically the dealership), it won't be possible to raise prices sufficiently to generate generate commensurate profits.

With lower industry profits, the losses for those firms that fail to hit a sweet spot will be worse. It will thus be much harder for firms that find themselves on left tail of the distribution of profits to survive. Chances are Saab won't be the last manufacturer to fold in the 21st century's second decade.

Followup: For a story focusing on this issue from that standpoint of one product, see"Toyota Threatened..." by Alan Ohnsman at Bloomberg.

Mike Smitka

Where are the French?

...they must have all the love they need at home...

Mike Smitka

First it was the Japanese. Then a couple Germans and the Koreans. Now the rest of the Germans. The Italians have one foot in the water. But except for a fleeting presence through American Motors, both with Simca as a subsidiary and later with Renault as an owner, the French -- who dominated the global industry in its formative years in the 19th century -- are nowhere to be found. Why?

Now it may be that Renault's control of Nissan represents de facto entry. Certainly purchasing is handled on a global basis, and there's cooperation in engineering. It may be that some Nissan products currently on sale in fact use a Renault platform (Perhaps one of my readers can fill in the gap.) But the absence is puzzling.

That's even more true of PSA (Peugeot-Citroen). The last time I looked (I'm probably showing my years!) they were doing well in Europe and solidly profitable. They keep up with technology, as seen in the customer base of the winners of the PACE Supplier of the Year innovation award for which I'm a judge. They're simply not here.

So what is their strategy? Do they believe that sufficient technology resides in the supplier base that they do not need sheer size to fund the R&D for tomorrow's products? Are they making enough money in small cars that they've chosen to "stick to their knitting" -- not venture into segments with which they have no experience -- and are therefore passing up the US market with its cheap gas and penchange for fuel guzzlers?

I don't know, but I've started to think about the variance in such "macro" strategy across the top vehicle assemblers. Suzuki strikes me as the closest analog, but they have a strong base in India, though it's probably no longer accurate to say that they dominate the market through their joint venture Maruti. Then there's Daihatsu, but they were gobbled up by Toyota and so, for better or for worse, are shackled to the small vehicle niche. Daihatsu long ago exited the US market; Suzuki seems likely to. So maybe PSA made a sensible strategic decision, and refused to join the herd in entering (and now exiting) the US.

My curiosity is piqued, but I have no answers.

Can an Automaker Incentive Battle Goose the Economy?

David Ruggles

As the economy wallows in the doldrums, is there any cause for optimism? The outcome of the European debt crisis is still unknown, and we know how markets despise uncertainty. There are still plenty of uncertainties associated with the so called “Arab Spring” uprisings in the Middle East, and those could be with us for a while. While fuel prices have somewhat moderated, they remain high. The country’s credit rating took an unnecessary hit, although plenty of money seems to still be seeking to buy our debt. When the Dow fell dramatically after the downgrade of our credit rating, much of the money that left equities found its way into our “downgraded” Treasury bonds. Either the European debt crisis or our government being hamstrung by ideologues has sent the Dow on a downer after the debt ceiling crisis “semi resolution.” The 12-member “Super Congress” still has an important job to do, and there is additional uncertainty attached to that, that will take weeks to resolve.

Bob Lutz - "Car Guys versus Bean Counters" Book Review

"Car Guys vs Bean Counters"
The Battle for the Soul of American Business
By Bob Lutz

Japan's Twin Earthquakes and other disasters

Japan is well on its way to recovery from the March 11 earthquake that rocked the country’s northeastern region and generated a tsunami that swept clean swathes of the coast.  Automotive output is recovering; between them, Honda, Nissan and Toyota plan to hire over 5,000 temporary workers in an attempt to catch up, which feeds back to help the rest of the economy, as well as the Tohoku earthquake region where Toyota's newest plants are located. But a second and wholly man-made disaster now threatens the return to normalcy.

Despite the magnitude of the March temblor, Japan was well prepared. Few deaths stemmed from buildings collapsing, trains stopped automatically, and factories were relatively unscathed. As roads were reopened and utility service reestablished, the auto industry was ready to resume output. And all along most of the economy trundled on; despite the horrendous scope of damage, the impact of 25,000 deaths and the total destruction of a swathe of coastal land in a society of 127 million is limited. Rapid recovery seemed certain, as was the case after not merely the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake which struck almost direct under Kobe, but even the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, which destroyed the Tokyo metropolis.

The auto industry was a hiccup in that process. Today's cars are hi-tech products, and the supply chain is correspondingly complex. Let one example suffice. Making a semiconductor chip takes two months from start to finish, and the ceiling fell in ― literally ― at a plant where an invisible speck of dust results in a bad part. Doing basic repairs, getting the clean room clean again, and then debugging machines is a multi-month process. Given the uniqueness of the chips, symptomatic of their "hi tech" nature, it was just as difficult to transfer manufacturing to a different facility, despite excess capacity elsewhere. Japan is a big place, however, and a river of engineers poured in to help. As a result, even the Renesas' "fab" is back in production, albeit at reduced rates.

The global industry remains vulnerable to disruptions; factories are prone to be unique. One reason is that the industry has not settled upon standards–though a July 26 article noted a new effort in that direction. [See a Japanese-language article in Sankei on a METI-coordinated committee on the issue. It cites Toyota saying that by 2013 they might be able to start purchasing under joint standards, but such standards would not apply to more than 30% of semiconductors.] Part is that things are evolving too fast. But firms also view chips, specialty steels, paints, engine parts, and now batteries as strategic. And there are no institutions in place: the old standard-setter, the Society of Automotive Engineers, is a shadow of its former self. With little commonality, dual-sourcing is not an option, magnifying risk.

Hindsight is not foresight. It's impossible to take into account (much less insure against) every eventuality. While a few mayors along Japan's coast had insisted on unusually high flood walls ― maybe reflecting (possibly corrupt) ties to the construction industry rather than prescience ― disaster scenarios didn't anticipate the magnitude of the tsunami. That increased the human cost, even if relatively few plants were located on the coast: most were inland, where land was cheaper

One exception was power plants, which needed access to water for cooling. We all know about the destruction of a set of four of the six nuclear plants at Fukushima I. Less known is that the Onagawa nuclear plant, run by Tohoku Electric Power, was both directly hit by the earthquake and by a higher tsunami; after all, an idle but undamaged plant isn't "news". However, it was of a modern design, on higher ground, and better managed ― and shut down without problems. Even more telling, a second set of four reactors, the Fukushima II complex, were also effectively unscathed. Yet the Onagawa plant and the other well-run utilities with intrinsically safe nuclear plants are being tarred and feathered by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power). In the background not-in-my-backyard politics at the local and prefectural level made construction of new electric generation capacity of any sort a slow process. So there is little excess capacity, exacerbated by the division of the country into incompatible power grids. Every power plant has to be brought back online if the country is to avoid brownouts for the years to come.

Unfortunately, Japan now suffers from a second earthquake, entirely man-made. The disaster now unfolding reflects politics.

Why? Prime Minister Naoto Kan of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), facing a divided Diet (parliament), was too quick over the past year to offer compromise to the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). (Perhaps that reflects his background as a community activist and lawyer, where the key skill is being able to hammer out compromises where common interests are central.) In the process, he alienated many in his own DPJ, without ultimately gaining the cooperation from the LDP that he needed to pass legislation. Then, under pressure from all sides, Kan struck off on his own with a populist measure to keep all nuclear power plants closed once they shut down for maintenance under a routine 13-month cycle. Within a year, then, all will be closed and remain off-line. Most are of the more modern Onagawa design, but they may now never be permitted to resume operation despite providing 30% of Japan's electricity. The economic impact of this will be huge and last for years, even as the economic disruption from the Tohoku earthquake itself ends.

Still, it is useful to remember the basic competitiveness of the auto industry, with multiple suppliers and assemblers following a wide array of strategies. Contrast Nissan, relatively unaffected by the quake, with Toyota. Twenty-five years ago Nissan began moving its production inside Japan to Kyushu, 1,500 miles south of the quake's epicenter, while reducing capacity in the Tokyo region. [Nissan had also been planning to boost output and so had built up inventories of chips and other items with long lead times before the quake struck on March 11th, so there was an element of luck involved, too.]

Toyota's strategy was different. It had acquired Kanto Jidosha and Central Jidosha in the Tokyo area in the 1950s, which together with Toyota Auto Body account for 30% of the company’s Japan-based output. In the 1990s, rather than paring capacity, they added plants to the northeast of Tokyo ― right where the earthquake struck.

That extra capacity left Toyota vulnerable to a second earthquake: an appreciation of the yen, at ¥78.5 per dollar as I write this, over 50% stronger than the ¥121 level of July 2007. With the extra capacity, and a commitment to pay employees whether there was work or not, Toyota increased its dependence on exports; Nissan did not. Toyota also has a byzantine web of domestic subsidiaries, a structure as unwieldy as the General Motors of old, with internal politics to match. So domestic production was attractive not only to alleviate union pressure but to protect the turf of incumbent executives and middle managers.

Now the earthquake itself will have a fleeting impact. Japan is after all a large place, with 127 million people. Horrific as 25,000 deaths may be, that and accompanying losses to the capital stock are tiny relative to the size of the economy. Capital can be fixed, and the size of the economy makes that relatively straightforward: a cumulative 4,200 engineers and other skilled workers poured in from the rest of the domestic semiconductor industry to revive production at the Renesas plant. The same story applies to electric power lines, roads and bridges, and other infrastructure, including the Sendai airport that was but recently under water. Many farmers were unable to plant this year's rice crop, the fisheries industry is only partially functional, and tourism is dead -- and all are important to the rural Tohoku region. But Toyota's plants are running again, and those of their suppliers.

Yes, the Tohoku earthquake was a disaster, as is the ongoing rise of the yen. The impact of both is amplified by dysfunctional politics ― electoral and corporate. Nevertheless, the industry as a whole is remarkably robust: its size and the variety that comes from rivalry lessens the impact of even major disasters. Toyota may be hit, and its recovery will be far slower than most observers seem to believe. A few American consumers may be disappointed, Toyota's U.S. dealerships moreso. But the global industry will hardly notice.

Mike Smitka

Taxpayers, The Auto Bailouts, and Politics

Last November, General Motors’ IPO set a record for money raised at 20.1 billion dollars. This is all money returned to the taxpayers’ Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The success of the IPO was not only driven by new investors, but also by stockholders and lenders who had been “stiffed” in GM’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy of 2009. The company recently reported its highest quarterly profit in more than a decade, helped by demand for fuel-efficient cars and a big gain from selling its stake in its former auto parts business. The biggest U.S. automaker said Thursday that it earned $3.2 billion, or $1.77 per share, in the first quarter. It was a great start for the year considering the spike in U.S. gasoline prices, a trend that would have sunk the company just a few years ago when it relied on gas-guzzling pickups and SUVs for profits. Earnings will accelerate if U.S. auto sales continue to creep back up toward the 15-million to 17-million vehicle-per-year sales rates the U.S. industry last saw in 2007.
"GM is making a lot of money at ‘depression levels’ of sales. As the market improves it should make even more money." said Dave Cole, chairman emeritus of the Center for Automotive Research.
The U.S. Treasury will remain GM's largest shareholder for now. It will likely take several years to unload the entire stake to keep from diluting its stock price. Taxpayers still own about 33% of GM shares. The stock price will need to rise to about $48.00 for the U.S. government to break even on its follow-on stock sales. At $48 per share, GM would have a market value of more than $90 billion.
Chrysler Corporation paid back more than 7.5 billion in loans to the American and Canadian governments in May. Chrysler had until 2017 to repay the loans, so this was six years ahead of schedule. The company has now paid back most of the loan money that saved it from going under. The government loans were high interest loans, about which Fiat/Chrysler Sergio Marchionne recently opined. Instead of merely complaining about “loan shark rates,” the company did something about it. The high interest on the U.S. Government loans certainly induced Chrysler’s partner FIAT to borrow the money to pay off the bulk of Chrysler’s outstanding government loans. Chrysler raised just over 3 billion through a bond sale and took out 3 billion in lower interest loans to come up with the money to pay back the government loans. This will save more than $300 million a year, according to the company.
The automaker still owes taxpayers about $2 billion. Treasury could get most of that back by selling its remaining 8.6 percent stake in the company, which it was given in exchange for the loans. Chrysler’s IPO has yet to be scheduled but FIAT just announced it is increasing its stake in Chrysler to 51% from the current 46% in advance of the upcoming IPO. As Marchionne recently observed, “The longer we wait, the more it costs,” referring to FIAT’s intention to buy shares from the U.S. Treasury.”
Chrysler’s recent earnings have also been strong, despite a market impacted by high fuel prices and a weak, but recovering, economy. Both companies stand to do extremely well as the economy improves and the SAAR rises to recent historical levels.
Both companies have announced initiatives to increase production and rehire thousands of workers. Chrysler alone has added more than 8,000 jobs since its bankruptcy.
In the meantime, Ford continues to do well in the still recovering economy despite having to bear the weight of interest on debt it accumulated to ride out the economic storm without having to seek taxpayer involvement. Ford has benefited from union concessions it received to maintain parity with its competitors.
The auto industry bailout, financed through the Bush Administration’s TARP program, spared the GM, Chrysler, AND Ford from liquidation and saved hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs at those companies and its suppliers.
To add perspective, had either company been forced into liquidation, the cost dropped on the taxpayers in the form of the Federal Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund would have been at least $38 billion. This in addition to the damage that would have been done to the North American industrial base, including military procurement at a time of two wars.
While Americans have been known to pile on “losers,” failures, and those who make mistakes, they love “redemption.” While there are those who refuse to buy a GM or Chrysler vehicle OR buy their stock because they were bailed out by the government, the companies’ strong sales and profit results indicate that, on balance, they are achieving a large measure redemption. The popularity of Chrysler’s “Made in Detroit” advertising campaign is further evidence.
In the meantime, the 2012 election campaign is getting underway and yes, it looks like the bailout of the auto industry could end up being one of many points of debate. One can expect Democrats to replay videos of Republicans who opposed the bailouts ad nausea. Already an ad paid for by the Democratic National Committee recaps positions taken by Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, and Tim Pawlenty.
Romney takes a significant hit in the ad. The former Massachusetts governor, whose father was governor of Michigan as well as the top executive at American Motors is being reminded of the hard-lined position he took in a 2008 New York Times Op Ed, “Let Detroit Go Bankrupt.” Yet Romney and others continue to use opposition to the bailouts as a campaign point, advocating a free-market system free of bailouts and subsidies. They maintain that even now it still looks like the bailout came at quite a cost to taxpayers, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. They maintain that allowing the automakers to go into liquidation wouldn’t have been such a terrible thing, which is easy to say since it didn’t happen.

Democratic candidates will point to the relative success of TARP and the auto company bailouts and paint a picture of what would have happened had TARP not been enacted and either company had liquidated.

As politics heats up leading up to the 2012 national elections, expect debate over the auto bailouts to play a major role in determining political winners and losers.

David Ruggles has spent his working life in every phase of the retail side of the auto business, new and used, sales and management, including consulting and training in both the U.S. & Japan. Ruggles has been a dealer for Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, Dodge, GMC, Ford, Mazda, and Subaru, and has consulted for one of the world’s largest privately owned Toyota dealer groups located in Japan. He blogs at autosandeconomics.blogspot.com and writes regular columns for several publications.

Contango

And other issues not commonly understood by consumers about the world oil market

The higher the price of gas at the pump, the more sensitive consumers are to allegations of oil market price manipulation. Most consumers are unaware exactly how any manipulation takes place, but they can't square the doubling of the price of a gallon of gas when the price of a barrel oil doesn't double, so they are suspicious there is a culprit to be blamed. Oil companies become the bad guys as they report high profits.

Cars and Roads

I'm now teaching my annual 4-week-long Spring Term course on the auto industry at Washington and Lee University, Economics 244, which will include one week in Detroit. Ironically, it has left me too busy to blog on the auto industry. So this will be short.

It's very easy in our narrow focus on the manufacturing and distribution of cars to overlook the revolutionary impact that comes from greater mobility. A note on a World Bank project in Laos highlights that. (Here's the link.)

The blog by Victoria Minoian traces the changes the follow from building a road that allows motorized access. Rural farmers can now grow vegetables for town and city markets, and not merely for own consumption. That is, they can earn a cash income. Doctors can access a village otherwise cut off on frequent occasions by high water. Children can get to school &endash; though perhaps by bicycle rather than motorized vehicle. There's little point in building good roads without motorized vehicles; but without roads, vehicles are also of little use. Of course the location of the village from which these examples were drawn reflects that constraint: it was alongside a river (the Mekong, not just a little river). The village wasn't necessary poor by local standards. But while boats and rivers make a difference, roads and motor vehicles make a bigger one.

Mike Smitka

Long Term Residual Outlook

I have been privileged to discuss residual values and the pre-owned market with a number of industry experts over the years. An thought that was born in a late 2008 discussion over a beer with Matt Traylen, then Chief Economist for Automotive Leasing Guide, has since become full-blown reality.

At the time, the stock market was tanking, new vehicles sales had slowed to a crawl, the auto manufacturers were begging for money before Congress, the acronym TARP had just been coined and the economy and our lives were looking bleak and uncertain.

Most lenders had announced in previous weeks that they were getting out of the leasing business, or dramatically “pulling in their horns.” The asset backed securities market had disappeared, pulled down by the mortgage backed securities market and we were hearing unpleasant terms like “toxic assets.” This reminded me of some earlier dark days in the auto industry when a dealer or leasing company might take particular vehicles to auction and they wouldn’t even draw a single bid, a particularly difficult position when one had a payroll due.

It was easy to understand how a bank holding a lot of “toxic assets,” but little cash, could become a “zombie bank,” a term invented to describe the Japanese banks after their own real estate bubble burst. That is a bank with a “strong” balance sheet but no cash to loan or to return to depositors who arrive “electronically” at the bank to make a withdrawal. Marking these assets to market was not practical because values could not be established as no one would bid on these mortgage backed securities or their “first cousin,” auto loan backed securities. Regardless, “mark to market” would have rendered the U.S. banking system insolvent and caused a complete meltdown. A strong case can be made that the U.S. banking system WAS, in fact, insolvent but for a few accounting entries.

After acknowledging that most of the major players had announced their exit from the leasing business, the collapse of available financing for fleet and daily rentals, and the dramatic drop off in overall new vehicle sales volume, Traylen and I asked, “Where will pre-owned inventory come from down the road?”

While used vehicle sales plunged from a high of about 44 million units in a single year to about 35 million units in 2009, it became apparent that once demand began to trend upward toward historical volumes, there would be an acute shortage of available inventory.

Within a few months, GM and Chrysler went through bankruptcy and Cash for Clunkers plucked another 600,000 potential pre-owned vehicles out of the system and fed them to the crusher. What was really crushed was the Buy Here Pay Here business. What the government called a “clunker,” they call “inventory.”

Today, there is considerable pent up demand for pre-owned vehicles and the banking system has recovered to the point that ready financing is available again. There are still serious issues to be resolved in the economy, not the least of which is high unemployment, but demand is building.

Other than unemployment, the biggest impediment to full economic recovery is the fact that 25% of American mortgages are in negative equity territory. The large numbers of foreclosures have left empty and/or abandoned houses in neighborhoods across the country further depressing home values. Few neighborhoods, regardless of affluence, are immune from this.

Economist Alan Greenspan, past chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, recently stated that he did not believe the economy could reach full recovery momentum until the real estate market experienced at least a 10% increase in home values. It just is not clear how long it will take for home real estate to become stabilized, let alone regain value. On the other hand, the rebound of the stock market has restored almost 16 trillion dollars of mostly American wealth.

Against this mixed backdrop of economic news and general economic uncertainty, there is much more demand than available pre-owned inventory, which is driving wholesale pre-owned prices ever higher. We see pent up demand in the new vehicle business by the steady increase in sales results.

New vehicle incentives have a considerable impact on pre-owned values. If incentives lower the true transaction price of new vehicles, the value of same make/model pre-owned vehicles drop a commensurate amount.

Restraint of late on the part of auto manufacturers to refrain from over production is keeping dealer inventory levels in line with demand. It is likely that OEM restraint on overproduction and incentives will be ongoing as they have new policies and labor agreements in place. The fact that dealer floor plan arrangements with lenders are much more restrictive than before has also helped maintain this equilibrium. Few dealers have the liberal floor plan arrangements these days that once allowed for the massive stocking of vehicles on behalf of a manufacturer looking to “force the market” with incentives.

But now that financing for leasing has recovered, OEM captive finance arms are focusing on shorter terms to try to create additional supplies of pre-owned inventory. Financing for the daily rental business has allowed rental companies to begin to return to more traditional replacement cycles. The same is true for fleets. But the shortfall that began in 2008 will not be able to be made up in the short term.

So what is the outlook going forward and how will it impact residual values?

Experts say we will continue to experience pre-owned shortages for at least as long as 5 years. Some niches will be more acute in this respect than others, and segment values could change with fuel prices and other issues.

But the tremendous shortfall in pre-owned inventory supply will take years to balance out as demand increases in line with economic recovery. In talking to experts like Tom Webb, Chief Economist for Manheim Auctions, Tom Kontos, Chief Economist for Adesa Auctions, Ricky Beggs, Managing Editor and Vice President for Black Book, Rene Abdalah, Vice President of Residual Value Insurance Group, Eric Ibara, Director of Residual Value consulting at Kelly Blue Book and Traylen who is currently head of M.A.T. Consulting, the consensus is that the shortage will be with us for at least 5 years. Residuals are expecting to stay quite strong!

However, in projecting residual values, there is a somewhat different outlook between Abdalah of RVI and Ibara of KBB and their counterparts at Automotive Leasing Guide. Both companies are convinced that as long as fuel prices increase gradually, American consumers will adapt without drastic short-term consequences. Consumers will tend to buy the largest vehicles they can afford.

Other than “early adopters,” most consumers will only pay a technology premium for “electrics” and hybrids if the government pays it for them through tax credits or other subsidies. When fuel prices suddenly spike, as they did in 2008, fuel economy becomes the consumer’s primary motivator. However, experience shows this is a short-term circumstance.

As we have seen repeatedly, and as recently as the price spikes in 2008, high fuels prices are followed by oil gluts and extreme fuel price declines as oil producers rush oil to market to capitalize on the high market prices, creating over supply. In 2008, the cycle began in April when the price threshold broke $4./gallon. By the time January 2009 arrived, a gallon of regular was $1.90.

So while there may be some price spikes along the way, Ibarra and Abdalah expect the overall fuel price trend will be gradual. As a consequence, manufacturers will have to deal with substantial Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) fines if consumers do not naturally purchase a product mix that lends itself to the auto manufacturers’, and the government’s, CAFE objectives.

In the past we have seen manufacturers prefer to pay significant consumer incentives to move vehicles they need to move to avoid the CAFÉ fines. With CAFÉ requirements at extremely high levels, it is logical to expect the focus of OEM incentives to be on fuel efficient vehicles. The CAFÉ standard for 2016 for cars is 39 mpg and 30 mpg for trucks. This will drive down the values of like make/model pre-owned vehicles. Lessors need to consider this very real possibility looking down the road.

At the same time, manufacturers can be expected to raise the price of larger less fuel efficient vehicles and reduce incentives to try to make more gross profit per unit, while somewhat depressing volume to enhance their CAFÉ calculation. As a consequence, Kelly Blue Book and RVI Group residual projections are higher for “heavies” than ALG’s projections while ALG’s projections are higher for smaller fuel efficient vehicles.

If a cataclysmic event takes place and oil goes to $200. plus per barrel, and stays there, all bets are off anyway.

Lenders, fleet operators, and private capital leasing companies will have to make their own overall residual setting decisions and come to their own conclusion about each size and fuel economy segment. However, there is no doubt that overall residual values will stay historically strong in the years to come as strong demand for pre-owned vehicles overwhelms the available supply.

David Ruggles has spent his career life in every phase of the retail automobile business and has consulted and trained with hundreds of auto dealers in the U.S. and Japan. Ruggles has been a dealer for Chrysler, GMC, Mercedes Benz, Ford, Mazda, and Subaru. Author of the Ruggles Report, and a regular contributor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, he blogs at autosandeconomics.com and writes regular columns for several trade publications and The Daily Post.

David can be reached at ruggles@msn.com and by phone at 312.925.1863