Bad News for Toyota? – the Detroit 3 are Back

...the Detroit 3 are returning to the midsized-car segment...

I'm tossing out back issues of Automotive News to try to fit into a corner office with more windows but less shelf space. I know, crocodile tears for this academic with his shelf-filling collection of books and journals. Anway, one headline caught my eye: "What can save the Detroit 3? Cars!" [a John K. Teahen, Jr. editorial from Sept 18, 2006, p 16].

The context was the near-exit of GM, Ford and Chrysler from the car market, which decreased monotonically from 89% of their sales in 1965 to 35% in 2005, while (correspondingly) trucks went from 11% to 65%. Now admittedly trucks were incredibly profitable on a unit basis, while small cars were a necessary evil, intrinsically unprofitable but needed for CAFE (the Corporate Average Fuel Economy mandate). But the decline at the Detroit 3 was disproportionate to the shift towards light trucks in the over US market.

One point is that ambitious designers, engineers, and senior managers all want to be associated with halo the ka-chenk of good bottom-line vehicles. Teahen argued that the Chevy Impala remained a potential money-earner, with hoped-for sales a bit above the 296,000 of 2006. In fact, on a platform basis, output was higher – 500K – reflecting the multiplication of nameplates that were in fact the same basic car, but the implication of the editorial was that it wasn't making much money. And even with the shift of the overall vehicle market towards light trucks, such sales pale besides the 1-plus-million mark hit of 1965. GM wasn't putting its heavy hitters on car projects.

I've argued before on this blog that Toyota lavishes undue attention on the Prius and on the Lexus marque, again reflecting the status of these projects within the company as a whole. Reputedly Toyota's working to correct that bias, devoting more effort to the 2012 version launched in December 2011. Time will tell if it is better executed and better selling.

Today, however, the Detroit 3 are a factor. They have very different cost structures, with the removal of the millstone of legacy costs from around their neck, a function of the aging of workers "retired" under pre-2007 restructurings, the impact of the VEBA and (for GM and Chrysler) additional costs shed under bankruptcy. Labor is no longer a fixed cost. They thus no longer need to maximize revenue [which for you economics junkies is also implied by the low marginal price of labor]. Instead they can aim to make money from cars. We see that in reduced incentives, reduced fleet sales -- that is, higher prices -- and a normalization of residuals. (I can't speak of leases -- I lack knowledge and suspect that option continues to suffer from the aftershocks of the financial upheaval of 2008-9.)

What does that imply for those who remain focused on cars, particularly Toyota, Honda, and Nissan? On the one hand, they ought to benefit from less discounting. On the other hand, they are hurt by reinvigorated Detroit 3 products. The latter, I believe, dominates: from Toyota's perspective, they have two new, heavy-weight competitors in GM and Ford (and in some product categories, a 3rd in Chrysler), and while Hyundai has been around for a while, sales of the Sonata are only now such as to represent a major slice of the mid-size segment of the Camry and the Accord. If you've become a bit sloppy dare I say arrogant? the sudden appearance of new competitors can be very painful.

My prediction thus is that Toyota (and Honda) will resort to greater discounts and higher fleet sales. That should be good news for new car buyers. (Car renters will have greater choice, but price may not budge much, better residuals will work against higher initial acquisition costs for Enterprise and their rivals.) But since Toyota relies on exports from high-yen Japan for Lexus and (to a lesser extent) the Prius, they've taken a major hit to profits on that front. I'll leave it to financial analysts to pour over segment results of the major players, particularly Toyota, to see if the new competition means their US profits take a hit as well.

Mike Smitka

comments welcome, here or via email!

Reverse Import Deja Vu?

...a strong yen should boost exports to Japan...

In 1992 I wrote a paper about Japanese car imports, later picked up by the Economist, in Japanese by Toyo Keizai (東洋経済) and by the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program about the growth of Japanese car imports. Ah, but what news was in that? Well, I was writing about "reverse" imports by Japanese of their cars from the US to Japan, alongside the sales of German firms, the only foreign companies to set up proper dealership networks and import processing infrastructure. The recent strength of the yen against the US dollar and particularly against the Euro, made me wonder if we will see a return to that era.

A headline in the May 24th Sankei Shinbun web site thus caught my eye: Mercedes-Benz will sell the "Smart for Two" for ¥1.59 million (US$19,992; €15,950), about a 14% reduction in price. Other forthcoming models of M-B and BMW will likewise carry lower sticker prices or add a lot of options without raising the price. Now the article doesn't make it clear whether the base is appropriate -- it uses year-on-year comparisons, and in general spring 2011 was not a normal time. Still, it cites rises of 37% for M-B and 27% for BMW.

I've only glanced quickly through recent data: given the volatility of the global economy in general, and the post-3/11 economy of Japan in particular, I was expecting to find the data too noisy to interpret. That's not the case.

First, overall imports are at the highest level in the years for which I have (FY1999 to present), even though at 4.0 million cars FY2011 sales are 10% below their mid-2000s level (and 20% below the 5.1 million unit sales peak at the top of Japan's bubble in 1990).

Second, while the German firms are doing OK, both BMW and Mercedes are down from 2007 and the onset of the global recession; only VW and Audi show signs of a sustained increase. What really is driving the increase is Nissan, which now accounts for about 17% of imports or 50,000 units. This is surely consequent to their moving the production of certain vehicles (such as the March) entirely out of Japan.

Still, total imports of 295,000 units remain rather short of the 393,000 level of 1996. While the Japanese media may be full of hand-wringing about the impact of the yen, the evidence so far is modest, when looked at through the lens of vehicle imports. Realistically, it's probably too soon to tell; vehicle sales strategies are penciled in a couple years in advance. We aren't seeing "reverse imports" of Japanese-brand cars from the US -- yet. So from that perspective we're also not back in 1996, when 85,000 Toyotas and Hondas went westward across the Pacific. But it is worth watching.

Source: 「１５９万円のベンツ 円高追い風、価格抑え輸入車加速」 which freely translated says "Fanned on by the strong yen, a Benz at ¥1.59 million will accelerate imports." From sankei.jp.msn.com of 25 May 2012.

...Mike Smitka...

Who Would BUY a Chevy Volt?

Who In Their Right Mind Would BUY a Chevy VOLT?

After all, it’s $40K – think about what else one can buy for $40K! There are very nice Lexus, Benz, Infiniti, BMW, and Cadillac models in that price range. AND even with a government subsidy it doesn't stand on its own at $40K. Even if gas hits $5, it doesn't work. Plus who knows what it will be worth in 39 months, or 36 or 48 for that matter. If new technology trumps it, it could be next to worthless. Why take the risk just to be known as an "early adopter?" That's why Bob Lutz, the Father of the VOLT, told us at a fleet conference a while back, "It won't SELL. That's why we're leasing them for $350/month for 39 months."

Lutz says, "We gotta start somewhere if we EVER plan on achieving economies of scale." In true Lutz fashion he compared the VOLT to hunting ducks. "If you shoot at the duck, you will miss it every time. One has to "lead" the duck to hit it. We need to lead the market to have a chance to hit it. If we wait too long, the train has left the station and we are standing on the platform saying, "What happened?"

"Lead, follow, or get out of the way, said Lee Iaccoca. Lutz concurs.

Toyota lost money on every PRIUS beginning in 1996, and did for quite a while. That vehicle is thought to be profitable these days, although they are typically "tight lipped "on such matters. Toyota is now bringing a plug in hybrid to market. (The VOLT was the world’s first plug in hybrid.) Toyota has lots of experience and satisfied hybrid customers now, along with economies of scale.

In the meantime, the VOLT has attracted detractors. The Right Wing in the person of Rush Limbaugh has embraced the VOLT as a car they can hang around the President's neck, despite the fact it had been in development long before he was elected. Actually, Lutz IS the actual "Father of the VOLT." For Lutz to get after the Right Wing takes some doing -- see his Forbe article.

The barrage of untruths continue. A friend from told me that it would take 3 weeks to drive across the country in a VOLT with all the stops to recharge. He said heard it on Right Wing talk radio. In fact, the electric range on VOLT is about 45 miles before the internal combustion engine takes over to propel one across the country as with a normal car. It IS true that the internal combustion engine recharges the batteries which drives the electric motors rather than being actually connected to the drive train in a conventional manner. But to the driver, the difference is not noticeable except the engine doesn’t change RPM based on throttle position.

Others claim they catch fire in a collision. The VOLTs that caught fire had been crash tested and stored improperly for weeks before they caught fire. A vehicle with a regular lead acid battery stands the same risk if stored improperly. As with normal vehicles, the battery should have been removed.

A driver with a less than 30 minute commute to work, and a place to plug in while there, could drive all month without the internal combustion engine using any fuel at all. Figuring 50 miles per day plus other driving, one saves two tanks of fuel per month or about $120. Subtract that from the $350 lease payment and the VOLT can be easily justified. BUT GM has NOT made that case. Worse yet, sales people in Chevy dealerships haven't either. And coupled with the Right Wing misinformation blitz, GM has shut down production for 5 weeks to balance inventories. In my mind, the story has been that GM has not done the math for consumers in their marketing efforts. The marketing story is "$350 minus $120 equals $230./month. That WORKS!!!!!

[Smitka: But obviously consumers don't do the math -- ditto with the Prius, as there's no strong case for buying it on the basis of fuel savings, which is why no other hybrid, including those made by Toyota, sell well. In other words, people buy a Prius to make a statement – hence you don't find "base" models on the lot, the main reason Toyota may make money on the vehicle, despite the cost of installing two powertrains plus a battery pack. GM needs to borrow a bit of that marketing. At the moment, of course, so does Toyota....]

David Ruggles, April 17, 2012

Lights Turned Off at Bright Automotive

...new technology can't target the mass market...

The long-run goal for electric vehicles is the mass market. The expense of new technology means that is not the place to start. Instead, there are two alternatives. One is to target the high end of the luxury segment; that is Tesla's strategy. It's not clear, however, that that market is sufficiently large for two firms to survive, and the second – Fisker – is late to market. Others, such as Aptera, wanted to turn out a (very) small vehicle and charge a (super) premium price for it. The vehicle itself would certainly have attracted attention. But the very rich insist on luxury as part of the package, and a tiny car can't deliver that.

The other option is to target a market that is particularly sensitive to fuel efficiency: commercial fleets. That was the strategy of Bright Automotive. Vehicles for (say) UPS in an urban area are on the road all day, with fuel a significant operating cost. But they're not on the road at night, and they may not travel long distances, only long hours. The space and weight of batteries is less of a constraint; there's no chicken-and-egg issue of whether there are enough recharging stations, because they are only needed at the corporate garage. And it's possible to create a value proposition, that the gains in efficiency will offset the higher up-front capital costs. Car purchasers aren't particularly good at that sort of calculation, focusing on "first cost" (purchase price) and not life-of-vehicle costs.

Bright in fact was able to attract purchase commitments from customers on the basis of actual vehicle cost and performance specs. What they needed was capital, in order to fund the nitty-gritty up-front costs of engineering and testing / regulatory approval, and to provide operating capital to let them produce vehicles – they would have to pay workers and capital equipment suppliers and (depending on their bargaining skills) suppliers of parts and components before they were able to deliver their first vehicle and build their revenue stream. And unlike the "supercar" entrants they were looking at production at a relatively high volume; they couldn't accomplish that on a shoe-string, taking the money from the first vehicle they shipped to pay for the parts for the second one. In other words, they intended to be a viable, volume operation, in it to earn a tidy profit on an ongoing basis. But to be a real company in the auto industry takes a lot of resources.

Reuben Munger, the founder, is a W&L econ grad, but that alone isn't enough to impress me, except that he was an exceptionally good student. Reuben is also a former investment banker, and had "skin in the game." Another notch in his favor. We were able to bring him to campus; he met with some of us faculty privately, and gave presentations to our students. What he said made sense, and I'm a hard sell, as I've sat through a lot of presentations of the business case for innovations in the automotive sector.

From the beginning those involved with Bright understood the venture to be risky. However, they were able to raise initial capital for the R&D part of the venture – including from General Motors – because there would be money available for working capital from the Department of Energy loan program.

Unfortunately, that loan program seems to have unofficially closed its doors. The undercurrent in media reports is that it is a victim of the election campaign, where the loans are being tarred by the failure of Solyndra. (See stories in the Washington Post and in Automotive News.) I also wonder if those involved at the Department of Energy were fixated on passenger vehicles; unless you know something of the industry, selling trucks to Snap-On doesn't sound sexy or central to US energy policy.

I've encountered that mindset, even among people with some real grounding in the auto industry, who ought to know better. But then I've benefited from serving as a judge for the Automotive News PACE supplier innovation competition [link], where I've heard the business case for innovations with target markets across the industry, from machine tool and test equipment suppliers, to suppliers of (not-so-generic) materials, to suppliers of components specific to the long-haul "semi" market, to suppliers to the aftermarket (replacement parts), and suppliers to dealers, as well as the "traditional" Tier I suppliers of parts that go into high-volume passenger cars.

One of the hurdles for a firm to win a PACE award is that they show a credible customer has purchased their innovation and has it in use, on the road. And often one customer isn't enough. So when I learned that a number of hard-nosed customers had signed up (I know a bit about one of them, Snap-On), well, I thought Bright should be a slam-dunk. Too bad, because the US needs firms like Bright.

Mike Smitka, Prof of Economics
Washington and Lee University

Toyota vs GM: Guess Who's the Dinosaur!

...economic theory says dominant firms adopt strategies that undermine their dominance ...

This isn't an enthusiast site, and I'm not a car guy. My family didn't have a second car growing up so tinkering with one never became a hobby. My attitude is horribly utilitarian: a car's function is to get me from point A to point B. So my own vehicle is 24 years old, my secondary one is 14 years old (while my wife's is only 8 years old). When I go on long trips I try to rent a car. And when I visit auto suppliers as a PACE judge or otherwise do the limited travel in which a normal academic engages, I also rent cars.

That said, I have written on this blog about the logic of a leading firm to "never be first" (in its heyday this was the case at GM, and in the past two decades became an operating motif at Toyota). Furthermore, there is an internal bureaucrat logic at large companies. I've not interviewed people about this, so I'm not being my normal careful academic self in stating it, but I surmise that if you're an ambitious engineer / designer / marketer at Toyota, you wanted to be associated with the Scion (Akio Toyoda's pet project) and with Lexus (prestige and profits). To work on the Camry would be a ho-hum posting. You wouldn't be using it as a platform to launch new technologies. It isn't a platform for future products for developing markets.

That would be quite different at a Hyundai or at today's GM. Hyundai started out with a very small market presence, both quantitatively and prestige-wise and in the size of its cars. The Sonata received a lot of attention, details well done including NHV, but I've not driven one for a couple years so don't know the new model. GM needs to reconquer the sedan market. I've driven both the Malibu and the Impala -- the latter so quiet that I had to double-check that I'd turned on the engine, and with a "clean" interior. I was impressed.

Then there's the Camry – I drove a new one with a few thousands miles on it. It was noisy, wind noise in particular. Then there was an occasional vibration from somewhere in the instrument panel, a matter of both design and (poor) build quality. Next was the instrument panel itself. I counted 12 active functions in the speedometer area, a cacophony of visual information (the mixed metaphor seems appropriate). Speed. Tachometer. Miles per gallon performance. Engine temperature. Odometer. On and on. Other than the speedometer, you really had to take your eyes off the road to decipher these functions – and it wasn't clear why a driver of a modern, automatic transmission family sedan would want a tachometer or most of the other functions. Dysfunctions, actually. There was also a large and hard-to-use LCD display -- and the gas mileage information on it didn't match that found next to the speedometer. Furthermore, the hands-free phone function didn't work consistently, particularly dialing out. The developers clearly hadn't done their homework on testing the bluetooth protocols of various phones against their system. Finally, it drove like a modestly responsive boat. That may be what older drivers want – and by older, I mean those pushing age 80. I don't think that's really their target market in theory, and in practice age 70-something drivers wouldn't be particularly receptive to the boatload of gadgets confronting them every time they got in the car.

So, this is congruent with economic theory. A dominant player plays it safe, and puts its resources into growth areas and pet projects of senior management. Over time of course they lose their dominance. But this sort of thing is not easy to turn around, viz. GM's experience. Toyota has a well-entrenched bureaucracy, structured in ways that date back to when they were an exporter of models developed in Toyoda City. On the marketing side in the US there was Toyota, and Southeast Toyota, and Southwest Toyota, rather than a national structure. And they've bought into the upmarket strategy, with profits (and internal kudos) from Lexus and not small cars. That no longer matches their actual market base and production base, and it leaves them ill-suited to tap new markets such as China and India.

I strongly suspect that this is well-known at Toyota itself; after all, there was an internal coup in Toyota that elevated Akio Toyoda earlier than planned under the normal bureaucratic progression, even before the recall scandal. The Camry suggests however that organizational dynamics are deep-seated and have to date resisted change.

Mike Smitka

Bush 43 at NADA 2012

LAS VEGAS ― Having hit a low in 2009 due to the trauma of two domestic automakers nearing bankruptcy and the overall industry in turmoil, the annual National Auto Dealer Association convention this year was indicative of the vigorous rebound of the industry as a whole. Attendance was brisk and the expo hall was packed with vendors. Spirits were upbeat and optimism abounded.

As the final speaker on the closing day, former President George W. Bush had the last word. The hall was packed during his 25-minute prepared remarks and subsequent Q&A, with outgoing NADA Chairman Stephen Wade asking the questions. The ex-president showed his human side with a liberal mix of applause lines and humor. He cracked up the room on numerous occasions with spontaneous off-the-cuff remarks. He devoted some time to trying to sell his book, But every time Bush mentioned Decisions Points, he added with a wry expression and a twinkle in his eye, “We still have plenty of inventory.” The line became funnier every time he said it. “Did I mention, we still have plenty of inventory?”

Despite the fact that the room was primarily Republican, based on an informal polling, (and my interactions over the years with hundreds of dealers) there was no booing or hissing for the fact that then-President Bush authorized the advance of a bridge loan of $17.4 billion from TARP funds to GM and Chrysler in December 2008 after having been turned down for a bailout package by Congress. In current RW rhetoric, this is known as “government picking winners and losers.”

So given the audience, and after first spending some time on his personal battles with alcohol, Bush addressed the economic situation he faced at the end of his presidency. In fact, the auto industry rescue/restructuring might as well be termed the rescue of the North American industrial base, since that is what was at stake. Bush spoke glowingly of the advice and support of Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. He cited them as perfect examples of people a leader should surround himself with to offer insights on subjects about which the leader is unfamiliar.

Speaking of the massive government support for the financial services industry by his administration during the economic collapse of late 2008, Bush says: “In a normal environment, the free market would render its judgment and they could fail. I would have been happy to let them do so. As unfair as it was to use the American people’s money to prevent a collapse for which they weren’t responsible, it would have been even more unfair to do nothing and leave them to suffer the consequences. The consequences of inaction would have been catastrophic.”

Regarding the economic crisis, “If we’re really looking at another Great Depression, you can be damn sure I’m going to be Roosevelt, not Hoover.” “Wall Street got drunk, and we got the hangover.”

In his book, Bush says he “opposed the Carter/Reagan bailout of Chrysler.” “Yet the economy was extremely fragile, and my economic advisors had warned me that the immediate bankruptcy of the Big Three would cost more than a million jobs, decrease tax revenues by $150 billion, and set back the country’s GDP by hundreds of billions of dollars.”

Stipulations attached to the billions in Bush Administration “bridge loans” ultimately cost GM Chief Executive Rick Wagoner his job, despite the fact many have “blamed” the next President.

Bush refrained from getting involved in the current politics other than to say “he understands the immense pressures of the job, and that it would be counter-productive for him to weigh in.” Despite the occasional malapropism, he conducted himself with class and grace with a large dose of Texas one-liner humor. While history may judge him harshly on some issues, it seems clear that the decisive action he authorized saved the economy, and in particular the auto industry, from a catastrophic meltdown.

David Ruggles

Comment by Mike Smitka: Certainly Wall Street got drunk, but it was policy that supplied the hooch. Greed on Wall Street isn't new; the ability to indulge however was. Both historic checks were removed. The first was that of regulation, which limited the ability of bankers to gamble with other peoples money (bankers have long demonstrated an ability to keep winnings for themselves while sticking others with losses). The second was monetary policy, which historically kept the supply of funds roughly commensurate with normal loan demand. Here Bush also leaned on outside advisors, Greenspan in particular but also Paulson and to some extent Bernanke -- though Bernanke was in subordinate positions as a Fed governor and then chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, as he was not named Fed chairman until 2006, by which point real estate prices had largely peaked.

Bob Lutz, the VOLT, and the Right Wing

The recent media coverage of so-called “Chevrolet Volt fires,” especially by the conservative talk shows and Fox News, has attracted my attention and ire. Let’s set out the facts (and feel free to check them yourself):

1. Not one Chevrolet Volt has ever caught fire in normal use or in accidents. Not a single one.
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, even after the highly artificial crash test (placing the car on its back, even though it did not roll over in the test) nevertheless awarded the Volt NHTSA’s highest crash-safety rating: 5 stars. Volt is supremely safe.
3. The crashed Volt, its battery shorted by coolant from the period unjustifiably spent “feet up,” caught fire three weeks after said test. (I submit that this would provide adequate time for surviving passengers to exit the vehicle.)
4. On average, 278,000 cars with gasoline engines caught fire in the U.S. each year between 2003 and 2007, according to the National Fire Protection Association.
5. No factory-produced electric vehicle has ever caught fire, to the best of my knowledge.
6. The Volt, the most technologically advanced car on the planet, was conceived by me and my team well before any federal bailout of GM.

These are the bedrock facts.

Now, how did the U.S. right-wing media choose to report this admittedly headline-tempting news? A nationally syndicated editorial three-panel cartoon stated (I believe I remember the sequence): “Thomas Edison discovered electricity;” then, “Alexander Graham Bell discovered the telephone;” and, in the third panel, “But it took the US Government to discover fire!” (accompanied by a drawing of a burning Chevy Volt).

Meanwhile, my fellow cigar-aficionado and erstwhile friend Rush Limbaugh launched the usual outraged, breathless tirades, denouncing the Volt as a typical failed President Obama initiative, on a par, grosso modo, with the dreaded Obama Care. The screen regularly depicted an exploding Chevrolet Volt.

But the Oscar for totally irresponsible journalism has to go to The O’Reilly Factor on Fox News, with, as its key guest, Lou Dobbs. Amid much jocular yukking, the Volt was depicted as a typical federal failure. In attempting to explain why Chevy has sold fewer than 8,000 Volts, Dobbs states, flatly, “It doesn’t work.” He elaborates, “It doesn’t go fast and go far on electricity. What happens is it catches fire,” adding that Chevy has recalled some 8,000 Volts. Bill O’Reilly, nodding approvingly, helpfully interjects: “So they’ve recalled cars that haven’t been sold.” Boiled down to the subtext, Dobbs’ message was this: “All Volts catch fire, and therefore all Volts have been recalled.” That simply isn’t the case.

Much air time was spent on the $50 billion-plus bailout, which, the audience was left to assume, “funded” the Volt, doubtlessly at the whim of Obama’s known army of evil enviro-Nazis, intent on forcing vehicle electrification on a good-ole’-boy, V8-lovin’ populace. To top it off, these two media pros lamented the fact that the same government that had forced GM to produce the Volt was now extending $7,500 tax credits towards its purchase, thus squandering even more of “our taxpayer” dollars on this failed Socialist-collectivist flop. Truth? The $7,500 tax credit was enacted under the Bush administration!

But who the hell cares about facts when you’re in O’Reilly’s self-described “No Spin Zone?” (The fine print might as well read, “We said ‘no spin,’ not ‘no deliberate misstatement of facts.’ ”) What on Earth is wrong with the conservative media movement that it feels it’s OK to spread false information, OK to damage the reputation of perhaps the finest piece of mechanical technology our country has produced since the space shuttle, OK to hurt an iconic American company that is roaring back to global pre-eminence, OK to hurt American employment in Hamtramck, Mich., as long as it damages the Obama administration’s reputation?

While as a conservative Republican I may well share the goal, I deplore the means employed to attain it. The conservative cause damages itself, destroys its credibility through the expedient spreading of untruths. The public will figure it out. The right-wing “talking heads”, O’Reilly and Limbaugh at the forefront, have managed to make me embarrassed to describe myself as a conservative.

Come on, you guys. Shape up! There’s plenty of legitimate fodder out there. Let’s leave the “invention of facts” to the left-wing climate-change alarmists.

Published in Forbes

Auto Bailout Redux and Mitt Romney

See the post on my parallel blog, US and Economics on Mitt Romney's puzzling statements on the government-led bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler. First, as I discuss there, Romney knows finance and so must know he's wrong. Second, and not discussed there, from my end it's not a bright strategy to take this stance in Michigan. After all, the UAW membership in my experience is strongly Republican in leaning -- it's the leadership who support the Democratics. So he's not exactly helping his cause, though I don't follow the ins and outs of campaign strategy and presume I am missing something.

Readers of this blog likely remember that it was Bush who bailed out the industry, with $17 billion or so in loans (the figure is from memory) with no strings attached except for providing a "plan". Obama would have none such, and let these firms file for bankruptcy. In the absence of a functioning financial market, the US government provided the DIP financing that is a normal and necessary part of Chapter 11, and took an equity stake when firms exited, again normal bankruptcy practice -- but the whole thing was extraordinarily well done, as large-scale bankruptcies normally take many years, not 90 days.

Now Rick Santorum is saying similar things -- see the following -- but we have no illusions that he knows anything about finance or economics. He seems to think that the normal "private market" Chapter 11 bankruptcy is quick, that recovery after one is prompt, and that in early 2009 private equity markets would have lent $50 billion to the industry. All three parts of this sort of claim are incorrect.

From Automotive News (link here):

GM and Chrysler would be "alive and equally as well, or better off, than they are now," Santorum told about 300 people at a Detroit Economic Club luncheon today. "The markets would have reacted to restructure it to be more competitive."

Read similar coverage on Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/auto-recovery-defines-terms-of-engagement-for-michigan-primary.html

Mike Smitka

It's a big, bad world...

...will 2012 ring in the red?...

It's a big world...but everyone is aiming to expand for a bigger world. Toyota of course intends to get back on track. Hyundai/Kia will hit 7 million units (see the Bloomberg story). GM will stay on top, with VW close behind, or maybe a bit ahead. Honda is simply hoping to recover, and awaits the performance of new models. Nissan is doing well, Chrysler is helping Fiat stay afloat. PSA (Peugeot) – well, because they're neither in the US nor in Japan, I tend not to hear much about them. Of course Mazda and Mitsubishi, dependent on exports from Japan, will be lucky to stay afloat in the face of a strong yen. Suzuki looks more and more like an Indian company, not important globally.

Of course the global market will expand in 2012 – we hope. Europe however is likely to see full-fledged recession, and I think it's optimistic that NAFTA won't feel a cold wind. (New England: brace yourselves for a nor'easter of historic proportions.) Japan – well, the economy will be slow and the number of licensed drivers continues to decline. China's growth will surely be slower than in 2011, while India remains small and (unlike India) has done little to improve the infrastructure that helps make car ownership functional. Brazil may do OK. All this means that the major markets will on the whole be stagnant or, in the case of China, slower but with much greater supply and hence softer pricing. (For the major economies in 2012, I find the December 15, 2011 prognosis of Morgan Stanley's Global Economic Forum thoughtful, particularly in its effort to integrate the projections for individual countries to provide a globally consistent story reflecting the integrating effects of trade and capital markets.)

Now we're not looking at a repeat of 2009. Indeed, on a total unit basis there will be growth.

I think the industry may face another shock, lower energy prices. After all, while emerging markets continue to emerge, if more slowly than in 2011, the developed markets will be moribund, depressing demand in what in the aggregate remains the biggest market for energy. Meanwhile, a period of high prices boosts investment in exploration and extraction / recovery. The output of those efforts takes a few years to start showing up in the market. Upon completion financial imperatives mean those projects will be hungry for revenue and will produce even if they face a soft market. Well, it's now been four years. That may be good news to the Detroit Three in the US, but it will mean that overall the market for energy-efficient vehicles will soften. Yet that's where the industry's players have poured their R&D. Sure, R&D is a long-run strategy that isn't expected to generate much of a short-term pay-back. However, it has short-run profit implications when it doesn't generate any up-front return.

It's hard for me to see 2012 bringing in more black; I can't tell a consistent upside story for the industry on a global basis. Single markets are less and less capable of driving results; we have entered an era where firms need more than their home market to generate profits. (A caution: for years the effective home market for Toyota and Honda has been the US, not Japan. That may also be the case for BMW.) However, I'm not (quite) pessimistic enough to say that 2012 will ring in the red.

Mike Smitka

More TrueCar

TrueCar.Com Truly Infuriates Many Dealers

by David Ruggles
WardsAuto.com, Dec 19, 2011 8:58 AM

Scott Painter says he wants to help dealers sell more cars. So why is the founder of TrueCar.com under attack by auto-retail people on social-network blogs and elsewhere?

Painter contends he is the dealer's friend when selling them his Zag/TrueCar lead-generation program. Then he says he is the consumer's friend in their price battles with dealers. Is it possible to take both sides of the same issue at the same time? He also says he wants to transform the industry by "commoditizing" new vehicles, which eliminates the need for salespeople and marginalizes losses. Have we been down this road before?

TrueCar has grown dramatically, making enough inroads to raise $200 million from venture-capital investors with which the firm promptly purchased Automotive Leasing Guide, the industry's highest-profile residual value predictor.

In a nutshell, TrueCar as an online lead provider offers dealers a deal that seems hard to refuse. They only pay for online leads that are closed as sales.

In the fine print is an agreement to give TrueCar access to information in dealership management systems. After all, how will TrueCar know how much to bill at the end of the month for the closed and delivered leads without verification?

But the firm also harvests data, in particular transaction-pricing information that TrueCar shares with car consumers visiting its website. After seeing what other people paid for the same vehicles they are interested in, they can make an offer.

Painter says that pricing data does not come from DMS units. Even if it doesn't, it puts additional pressure on dealers under the guise of providing "a public service." Is there another industry where consumers feel they have the right to know a seller's actual true costs?

Scott Painter under fire from dealers.

Eventually dealership people, led by Jeff Kershner, figured out what was going on.< Now, an industry movement is swelling against TrueCar. There is plenty of information on industry social-network blogs, with more being added by the minute. Hundreds of people have weighed in. Jim Ziegler's blog has had more than 12,000 views.

"There really is only one way to stop this nonsense with vendors," says dealer Tamara Darvish of the Darcars Automotive Group in Maryland. That requires "a gentleman's agreement" among dealers not to exchange DMS data for leads, she says. "Unfortunately, greed and ignorance often take priority with some, rather than logic and long-term planning."

TrueCar's Devin LaCrosse provides the other side of the story. By enabling participating dealers to provide upfront, no-haggle price quotes, TrueCar has helped over 5,500 dealers nationwide sell over 400,000 new and used vehicles, he says. TrueCar lowers dealership selling costs "by providing high-quality customers and no need for haggling, and provides free transaction-based pricing data to help dealers price vehicles scientifically."

Some would say TrueCar is not incrementally increasing vehicle-sales volume, just lowering dealers' gross profits. Some dealers are doing more volume at the expense of others, but there is no evidence more vehicles are sold. Kershner, Ziegler and others think dealers unwittingly are enabling Painter to transform the auto business based on his perception of how it should operate.

Why are dealers going along with what seems like a self-defeating initiative? Many were caught unaware. They need to thoroughly read their contract with TrueCar. Dealers who have just learned what is happening are up in arms. Many are as angry at themselves as they are with Painter and his firm.

Everyone can draw their own conclusions. But some people are taking it very seriously. Ziegler calls it "the Battle of Armageddon for car dealers."

WardsAuto Dealer Business columnist David Ruggles is a former dealership general manager.